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PSYCHOSOMATICS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
By
EMILY MARX*

Freedom of speech and breach of the peace are traditional courtroom antagonists. Their latest bout' was won by "peace," to which all champions of controversial causes must now salaam2-until "freedom" regains the crown. A
college student addressed a street audience for twenty minutes on a subject of
major sociological significance-the inequalities suffered by negroes at the
hands of the whites. "The crowd was restless and there was some pushing, shoving
and milling around" as the student, in a "loud, high-pitched voice," told 75 to
100 whites and negroes that negroes "don't have equal rights and they should
rise up in arms and fight for them." At least one white onlooker threatened
violence unless the police interfered. "To preserve order and protect the general
welfare," the police thrice asked the student to step off his soap box. When he
refused, he was arrested, convicted of breach of the peace and jailed. The Supreme
Court affirmed because the student was not arrested or convicted "for the making
or the content of his speech" but only for "the reaction which it actually engendered." The local police, said the Court may interfere with a speaker who "passes
the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot."
Unfortunately for the defeated "freedom," people who stop to listen to an
outdoor speaker frequently become restless, angry, vocally demonstrative and
threatening when their prejudices and preconceptions are challenged or their resentments and grievances are championed. Less than two years ago, the Supreme
Court reminded the now defeated "freedom" that it best serves "its high purpose"
when "it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger."3 Having sought to fulfill its exalted
role, freedom of speech has now been told by the umpire that the rules were
changed in the interval and that it became a lawbreaker when it presented to
a mixed audience as well-known a blot upon our national escutcheon as the
unequal treatment of negroes by the whites.
Under the former rules, the speaker was on safe ground as to subject-matter.
4
He was not advocating the murder of the governing class, or counselling resist*A.B. Barnard College, 1923; L.L.B. Yale Law School, 1925; Editor Yale Journal; Formerly
Justice, Domestic Relations Court, New York City; Writer for various Law Reviews.

I Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 317, 324, 319-21 (1951).
2 Fear of subsequent punishment eliminates "freedom" from "freedom of speech." Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101 (1940). Freedom of speech is at an end if the speaker is compelled
to hedge and trim, to confine himself to innocuous and abstract discussion. Thomas v. Collins, 323
U. S. 516, 535, 536 (1945).

8 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949).
4 People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423 (1902); People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108 (1891).
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ance to military service in time of war, 5 or urging the proletariat to annihilate
6
the bourgeoisie state by labor strikes or military force, or encouraging violation
7
of a valid criminal law, which then constituted the tabooed fields of oratory.
Only such utterances had been held sufficiently threatening to the public peace
to sustain state statutts forbidding speeches thereon, His cause had long been
championed by the Supreme Court. In the face of legislative findings that equal
treatment of negroes would precipitate breaches of the peace and riots, it had
directed that negro voters, students, travelers, property owners, litigants, workmen, be given the same privileges and opportunities as their white counterparts.8
A presidential committee had found the unequal treatment of the negroes by the
whites "creating a kind of moral dry rot which eats away at the emotional and rational bases of democratic beliefs." 9 Legal periodicals had warned that racial discrimination among our citizens "is the greatest single danger to our foreign
relations" and could create "a threat to American security."' 0 Clearly his topic
was one on which he might speak without fear of imputation of disloyalty. His
words were not lewd, obscene, profane, libelous or insulting, which then constituted the "fighting words" not protected by the First Amendment." And yet, because the speech engendered resentment, restlessness and a threat of violence by
at least one member of the audience, the speaker is in jail. No word or act of
his is being punished, the Supreme Court took pains to point out; "Feiner was
stopped not because the listeners or police officers disagreed with his views but
because these officers were honestly concerned with preventing a breach of the
peace." 12 That phrase connotes "a disturbance of public order by an act of violence,
or by any act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation and
3
alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community."' The speaker on negro
inequality is in jail because, as the result of his utterances, there was a "troubling
of the wonted calm"' 14 of a sizeable stgment of the community in which he spoke.
5 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211 (1919);
Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920).
6 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Dennis et al. v. United States, 183 F.2d 201
(C. A. 2nd 1950), cert. granted 340 U. S. 863 (1950); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357
(1927).
't Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273 (1915)-nudism; Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S.
490 (1949) -restraint of trade agreements; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460 (1950)racial bases of employment; Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N. Y. 188
(1942)-defiance of Labor Board decision.
8 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U. S. 637
(1950); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948); Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Pierre
v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U. S. 232 (1949).
9 President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 139 (1947).
10 36 AM. BAR ASSN. J. 270, 273 (1950).
11 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942).
12 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 288 (1951).
18 People v. Chesnick, 302 N. Y. 58, 6o (1950). Feiner v. New York, note 1, was a conviction
under the New York Penal Law.
14 People v. Chesnick, note 13, p. 61; Feiner v. New York, note 1, p. 331-"this record shows
an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one man to haul the speaker from the stage" (Douglas,

J. dissenting).
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In spite of the Supreme Court's statement that Feiner was arrested and convicted only because of "the reaction" his speech engendered in his audience,
there is implicit in its affirmance the notion that the convicted speaker controlled
that reaction, that the same speech could have been delivered without engendering
the forbidden reaction and without troubling the wonted calm of his listeners.
He could not be prevented from starting his speech, on the streets or in the
public parks;' 6 but the police officers lawfully stopped him, summarily, when they
reached the determination that his audience was on the verge of violence.
Experiments now being conducted at the Cornell Medical College and the
New York Hospital conclusively show that if audience reaction determines
when a speaker must step from his soap box, the only speeches with a fair
chance of uninterrupted delivery are those presented to a hand-picked audience
or on subjects in which the general public has no particular interest.
In an endeavor to ascertain the causes of nonmicrobic diseases, the Cornell
experimenters subjected diseased and healthy persons to carefully selected oratory, aimed at eliciting the entire gamut of human emotions. Concomitantly, the
behavior of the internal viscera, blood vessels and skin of the patients was measured with special apparatus and photographed. Positive correlations were discovered
between certain topics and abnormal functioning of these organs. In the selection
of such topics, the patients were of little assistance; usually they were unaware
of the effect upon their bodies of the topics selected and even denied any emotional
feelings about them. The subject-matters causing visceral reactions varied with
each patient; each reacted differently to discussions directed at a group. But
there was always a topic to which one or more organs of the body of each reacted
by hypo or hyperfunctioning. In some the stomach behaved as when receiving
a poison; gastric digestion ceased, followed by distention, belching, dyspepsia,
nausea and ultimately vomiting. In some the stomach acted as when digesting
food; its mucous lining became engorged, motile, secreted gastric juices and
continued such activity until bleeding occurred. Ultimately such abnormal behavior results in peptic ulcers.' 6 In some the muscles of the intestines contracted as
during violent exercise and remained contracted for prolonged periods, causing
constipation. In some the intestines became overactive, vascular and turgid, causing diarrhea and hemorrhages. Ultimately this results in ulcerative colitis. 17 In
some the heart rate, cardiac output and blood pressure elevation increased as dur15 Niemotko v. Maryland, note 12; Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293 (1951); Saia v. New
York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939)-"the streets are natural
and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion." But see people v. Hass, 299
N. Y. 190, 194 (1949), appeal dismissed for want of fed. question 338 U. S. 803 (1949), upholding a license requirement for park speeches "for the safety, comfort and convenience of the
people."
16 LIFE AND BODILY DISEASE, published by the Assn. for Research in Nervous and MentalDiseases
(1950), pp. 628-73; 10641 This Volume contains detailed reports prepared by 132 experts in the
field, amply supporting the conclusions herein stated.
27 Op. cit. 679-88; 724-30; io65.

PSYCHOSOMATICS

ing violent exercise; in others, these decreased. Continuance of such abnormal
behavior results in permanent heart disease, improper functioning of the kidneys and illnesses stemming from interference with the circulatory system. 18
In some the clotting time and fluidity of the blood decreased, a condition causing
or predisposing to coronary and cerebral thromboses. 19 Some experienced breath22
backache,23
ing difficulties; 20 some attacks of migraine headache,21 asthma,
hives.2 4 In some the nose and airways became occluded, distended, turgid, with
vigorous mucous secretions, and the tear ducts and eyes behaved as in weeping,
causing the condition known as hay fever. 2 5 Having thus demonstrated to the
experimenters that their bodies felt these verbal discussions to be as menacing
and threatening as physical assaults, microbic invasions and injections of noxious
chemical substances, the patients were treated with discussions of neutral topics,
diversion and reassurance. This terminated the abnormal functioning of the agitated organs. 26 Without such medical aid, the abnormalities might have continued
for days, weeks or months; they do not cease automatically with the termination
of the discussions engendering the bodily reactions.
Stenographic records were kept of the patients' verbal utterances while their
viscera were misbehaving. These expressed the same 'motional reactions as the
affected organs.2 7 Hypofunctioning of the stomach was accompanied by words
indicating that the patient, like his stomach, felt the topic under discussion to be
one of which he wished to rid himself. Asthma, by words indicating that the patient,
like his nose and bronchi, wanted to shut out the disturbing subject and prevent it
from intruding upon him. Constipation, by words indicating that the patient,
like his intestines, was resolved to hold on to the aggravating job or marriage
with which he was saddled although it was not to his liking and he saw no
possibility of its improvement. High blood pressure, by an expressed readiness
to meet all comers and permit none to beat him to the draw. Backache, by
words indicating that the patient, like his overcontracting muscles, wanted to
activate his entire body, to "get out of here." Development of hives-a reaction
similar to the swelling resulting from an external blow-was accompanied by
words indicating that the patient felt he was being whipped and beaten. The patient
1
19
20
21
22
28

24
25
26

Op. cit. 799-816; 929-52; 1070-3.
Op. cii. 818-31; 1074.

Op, cit. 583-94; 1069.
Op.
Op.
Op.
Op.
Op.
Op.

cit, 609-14.
cit, 56-81.
cit. 750-71.
cit. 987-1007.
cit. 545-64.
cit. 666; 1090--cure does not require a removal of the cause but the substitution of new

credits such as "self respect, satisfaction from activities, belief in himself, his potential and in those
about him."
27 Address delivered before New York Academy of Medicine (1951) by Harold G. Wolff, the
leading authority in the United States on psychosomatics under whose direction the Cornell experiments are being conducted; Unpublished results of current experiments, made available by Dr.
Wolff for the purpose of this article.
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with overactive intestines wanted "revenge" and threatened "to get back at" and
"get even with" the person involved in the situation under discussion. Hyperfunctioning of the stomach was accompanied by the patient's expressed desire "to wring
the neck" of the employer then being discussed. The patient in whom clinical
discussions produced cold and moist hands-the usual accompaniment of bodily
exercise as the blood vessels under the skin constrict to prevent heat losswanted to "strangle" or "put a knife through" the man responsible for his
business difficulties. These were spontaneous utterances. 28 That they truly reflected
the patient's emotional reaction to the clinical discussion was verified by the behavior of his internal organs. In every instance the words spoken were but an oral
expression of what the internal organs were inwardly saying to medical observers
trained to understand their language. The verbal utterances of retaliation, aggression, assault, mayhem were generated by the same stimuli as the angered
overactive stomach, the resentful overcontracting muscles, the hostile diarrheal
intestines and the outraged constricting blood vessels. The stimuli were words having some special significance to the patient, not because of their dictionary or
import to the neighbors, but because they symbolized life problems and situations
with which the patient had previously been confronted and been unable to cope with
to his satisfaction.
Why some individuals react to such stimuli through their stomachs and
others through their blood vessels, skin, intestines or muscles has not yet been
discovered. But their bodies and their utterances consistently present the same type
of reaction each time they meet or are reminded of the distressing problem.
The reaction may vary in intensity, but not in the particular bodily organ functioning abnormally or in the purport of the concomitant verbal utterances. The
individual stirred to words of contemplated violence by discussions of his unsolved difficulties will repeat such words whenever that matter, or one he associates
29
with it, is discussed.
Efforts at typing individuals on the basis of racial stock, physical growth,
intellectual development, showed that certain types are more readily disturbed
by insurmountable interpersonal and societal conflicts. But the particular situation
that will cause a bodily reaction and the magnitude of that reaction cannot be predicted. This depends in large measure on capacity to postpone satisfaction, withstand frustrations and deprivations, tolerate anxiety and repression, adapt to
changing circumstances, endure prolonged monotony, as to which even individuals
of well-defined types differ radically. 30 The only generalization permitted by
28 Out of 127 persons examined during a current experiment, no exception occurred; each patient

in whom the clinical discussion (lasting approximately one hour) produced overactive intestinal
reactions simultaneously uttered words of revenge; each in whom the discussion produced cold and
moist hands wanted to "strangle" or otherwise assault someone. Note 27.
29 See note 27.
80 Op. cit. 1085. Such capacities frequently change during life, so that conflicts of great importance in youth may become unimportant at maturity, and vice versa, although the external situations
remain the same and still present insolvable conflicts.
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the experiments was that in a community such as ours feelings of frustration,
anger, humiliation, conflict and anxiety develop-without specific txternal pressure or stimulus-in individuals who feel that others are immune to or unduly
protected from the blows of fortune, that their lot in life might be improved,
that they are being exploited, or that the difficulties they have accepted as inevitable
and imminent might be avoided if others acted differently. 1 This conclusion was
reached from scientific experiments conducted by 132 physicians of national
reputation, although it bears a striking resemblance to the exhortations current
in the early days of labor unionization and peaceful picketing.3 2 A person to whom
such grievances are of overruling importance (consciously or unconsciously) will
react to them, through his viscera and oral utterances, whenever the subject is discussed directly or by an associated symbol. Over the visceral reactions, he has no
control. The more frequently his body is exposed to the situation it deems threatening, the more accentuated the internal reactions and concomitant oral utterances
become. A person to whom such grievances are insignificant-using bodily reaction as a criterion-will show less and less visceral and verbal response to such
subject.83 These are the human bodies and the vocal chords to which the public
speaker addresses himself.
The Cornell experiments furnish the first scientific explanation of audience
reaction to causes that seem important to some of us but fail to strike a responsive
spark in others. If the reaction is genuine and not stage play, the reactor has
had prior contact with the cause being discussed, or with a situation to which
he relates that cause. He, like the Cornell patient, harbors within him resultants
of interpersonal and societal conflicts experienced during his life. These may be
vague, latent hatreds, fears, resentments about his economic insecurity, the burden
of his marital status, his inability to meet neighborhood standards, dissatisfaction
with his place in the scheme of things. The forum topic, like the clinical topic, may
be the one he associates with his personal problem and to which his body and his
vocal chords react with like emotions. Th stronger his feelings about his personal grievance, the stronger will be his feelings about the forum topic which,
unconsciously, he makes his own. 4 The speaker acts upon him in the same
manner and by almost the same method as the physician acts upon his patient.
Both are exposing their auditors to a verbal barrage in the hope of evoking a
strong emotional response! 6 The physician has the advantage of closer personal
contact and scientific procedures for determining the situations likely to evoke these
81 Op. cit. 1087...
82 See cases cited in note 63, infra.
88 Op. cit. 1063.
84 Cahn, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949)

24.

86 As long as the speaker confines himself to oratory, he may run the gamut of rhetorical tricks
and devices to cajole his hearers into exchanging their ideals and institutions for his. Feiner v.
New York note 1, p. 329. "The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution
of learning. 'Free trade in ideas'means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely
to describe facts." Thomas v. Collins, note 2, p. 540,
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responses. The speaker must employ a trial and error method. Were he better
informed, he would know that he cannot inject emotions into his audience merely
by emitting them from a soap box. 36 He cannot arouse consternation, alarm,
fear, hatred or resentment in persons to whom his cause has no prior emotional
meaning. Nor can he incite such p'ersons to violence. But he can and in all
probability will rearouse such reactions in all persons who come to him-as did
the patients to the Cornell experimenters-with conscious or unconscious fears,
hatreds, resentments, anxieties concerning situations similar to or associated with
the subject-matter of his speech. A person who had no prior contact with minorities
or the problem of minorities might be interested in Feiner's speech; but if he
threatened violence after less than twenty minutes on the spot, it would clearly
be a faked reaction, colloquially known as heckling.
The right to speak to persons "most receptive" to the speaker's utterances
and at the moment of their greatest receptivity, gives the First Amendment its
only real value.3 7 It enables the community to discover which of its economic, sociological and political institutions its members fear, hate, resent to such an extent
that their entire beings are permeated with such feelings. It warned the "money
changers" that their days were numbered, and resulted in the Securities Exchange
Act. It warned employers and labor unions that their methods of settling disputes
were obnoxious, and resulted in the Labor Relations Act. It warned the Congress
and state legislatures that the 18th Amendment was a mistake, and resulted in
its repeal. It warned the industrial erecutives that their employees resented dependence on others during sickness and senility, and resulted in Workmen's Compensation, Employers' Liability Acts and Social Security. Throughout our national
existence, soap box orators, 'editorial writers and authors have performed for our
body politic the same service the Cornell experimenters are presently rendering
to their patients. Economic and societal fears, hatreds, resentments, anxieties were
thereby ferreted out.3 8 Sometimes they were cured by legislative or judicial removal of the conditions causing the fears. Sometimes they were ignored-with the
same result to the ills of the community that similar non-treatment of the ills
of the Cornell patients would have, i.e. the fears, hatreds and resentments are

9SThe

repeated reference to the man who shouts "fire" at a crowd when there is no fire
(Schenck v. United States, note 5 and most subsequent freedom of speech cases) as an instance
of speech which the state may prohibit because it creates a clear and present danger, is not medically
sound. A person who has never seen a fire or been told of its disastrous ffects, would not become
violent or riotous at the sound of the word "fire". The "fire" theory of freedom of speech resembles
the dangerous instrumentality theory of the negligence cases, and imposes on the speaker a duty
to anticipate the emotional reactions of his audience. In some sections of this country, a speech
on negro inequality would create a much greater disturbance than the shout of "fire" at a
crowd familiar with its dangers.
37 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 269, 278 (1941).
8 Butterfield, THE AMERICAN PAST (1947) 71, 79, 97, 150, 271, 313, 331, 339, 362, 375, 381,
420, 423 showing the effects of: Webster's reply to Hayne, Garrison's Liberator, Stowe's Uncle
Tom's Cabin, the Dred Scott decision, the cartoons of Nast and Keppler, Bryan's Cross of Gold,
Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick, Sinclair's The Jungle, Tarbell's History of the Standard Oil
Company, Wilson's Fourteen Points, Palmer's tirade against aliens and reds, John L. Lewis, Cough.
lin, Willkie's One World, and others less well-known.
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still with us. 3 9 The Cornell experiments show that even those fears-caused by
conditions which the community cannot or does not wish to alter-are alleviable
by changing the attitudes of the fearful or resentful persons to the economic or societal situations which disturb them. In our past, the persons who effected these
legislative and judicial cures and changed attitudes were the auditors and readers
in whom the speeches and writings engendered feelings of anger, resentment,
alarm and the concomitant verbal and physical reactions. They formed associations
in favor of or in opposition to the cause discussed, wrote letters pro and con
to editors and congressmen, picketed, rebelled and rioted until the societal advances
40
to which we now point with pride were achieved. Had thes-e auditors not been
aroused to activity, we might still be living in the horse and buggy age. The
First Amendment needs for its continued vitality speakers and writers sending
up trial balloons to audiences in whom these speeches and writings crystallize and
bring into focus longstanding and deeply felt unsolved interpersonal and societal
conflicts. The Cornell experiments show that the inevitable concomitant of such
speeches and writings is the "pushing, shoving and milling around" crowd and
41
its threats of violenc.
The Cornell experiments require reexamination, also, of the conclusive presumption that violence sufficient to endanger the public peace is "imminent"42
when a defamatory or inflammatory word is uttered in public. Innumerable
criminal offenses are committed by such utterances, all variants of "breach of the
peace" for which Feiner was incarcerated. The utterer of defamatory words is punished today for the reaction his words tend to engender in others, just as he was
for criminal libel in the Star Chamber proceedings of the 16th century. As in civil
actions, no proof of damage from or reaction to the utterance is necessary; words
traditionally libelous per se are by statute declared to be injurious to the public peace
and welfare, just as they were at common law. 48 But behind the statutory declaration stands the heretofore unchallenged assumption that they are "fighting words,"
i.e. words which will cause the addressee to fight back. These are words tending
to injure an individual's reputation, attributing to him traits, conduct or thoughts
abhorrent to the community and likely to cause him to be shunned, avoided, hated
44
or ridiculed by a "noticeable part" of the society in which he lives. They are
39 Op. cii. 126-Under Horace Greeley, the New York Tribune's star foreign correspondent was
Karl Marx; op, cii. 375-Under A. Mitchell Palmer, an anti-red hysteria pervaded the land. See
cases cited in notes 5, 6.
40 Op. cit. note 38 which lists one petty rebellion and riot after another from the Boston Tea Party
through the "public-spirited" assassination of Huey Long.
41 Unless the crowd has been pre-tested and all persons eliminated who might become physically
or vocally threatening when under emotional stress.

42 New York's Penal Law contains twelve separate offenses committed by the use of such words,
plus a "dragnet to cover newly invented crimes or existing offenses that cannot be readily classified
or defined," including the use of offensive or outrageous language not already penalized. People v.
Tylkoff, 212 N. Y. 197, 201 (1914) ; people v. Casey, 188 Misc. 352, 357 (City Ct. Utica 1946).
43 Although "one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common law on
liberty of speech and of the press." Bridges v. California, note 37, p. 264.
44 Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288, 290 (C. A. 2nd 1941), affd. 316 U. S.
642 (1942).
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deemed to endanger men's main source of contentment-the approbation of their
neighbors-and likely to anger the person defamed. Such anger may give rise to
violence by the individual directly affected as well as by his family, friends and
neighbors. Therefore the utterance of such words is a breach of the peace.
If the defamatory accusation is true, a civil action for libel will not succeed.
But truth is not a defense in a criminal prosecution. Since the question there
is whether the community will excuse the utterance of truths which are likely to
cause a reaction of violence, the utterer must convince the court that he had
"good motives" and "justifiable ends" in mind. If his motives were not "good" and
his ends "justifiable," he will be punished for disturbing the public peace. 45 His
criminal act is the utterance of words not an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas" and "by general consent" known to cause their addressees to fight back.4 6
Calling a man a communist or accusing him of having communistic sympathies
and affiliations is such a 'fighting word." 47 Others are: calling a public official a
"racketeer" and "fascist;" 48 a business executive a "liar;" 49 a married woman
the "latest lady love of a roue;" 5 0 a white man "a negro;" 5 1 a young girl
a "concert-hall singer and dancer at Coney Island;" 52 a small-town citizen
"unprincipled" and a "curse" to the community. 53 Hurling such epithets at
54
groups or classes of persons is similarly a breach of the peace.
While there is no constitutional privilege to utter such words, the conclusive
criminal effect given to them tends to discourage public discussion and criticism.
Although animosity, anger and resentment may be engendered thereby, the Cornell
experiments cast doubt on their tendency to cause sufficient violence to disturb
the public peace. If there is in fact no such tendency, the community is depriving
itself of the socially desirable spreading of truth and free criticism of all matters
of public interest. 55 For this reason, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that,
45 e.g. N. Y. Penal Law, sec. 1342. In New York, by constitutional provision, the jury determines
the facts and the law in a prosecution for libel. People v. Sherlock, 166 N. Y. 180, 186 (1901).
46 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, note 11, p. 572, 573. Cf. King v. Philipps, 6 East 464,
102 Reprints 1365 (1805)-letter reading: "You; have behaved like a blackguard. I shall expect
to hear from you on the subject and will punctually attend to any appointment you may think proper
to make," held to incite addressee to challenge sender to fight a duel and therefore a breach of the
peace.
47 Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N. Y. 94 (1947); People v. Gunther, 193 Misc. 838 (Mag. Ct. N. Y.
1948), Kaminsky v. Am. Newspapers, Inc., 283 N. Y. 748 (1940). Words held libelous per se
in civil suits would also be criminally libelous.
48 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, note 11.
49 People v. Moore, 116 Misc. 525, 528 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. 1921).
50 Sydney v. McFaddan Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208 (1926).
51 Upton v. Times Democrat, 104 La. 141 (1900); Flood v. News and Courier Co., 71 So. Car.
112 (1905).
52 Gates v. New York Recorder Co., 155 N. Y. 228 (1898).
58 Abell v. Cornwall Industrial Corp., 241 N. Y. 327 (1925).
54 State v. Beauharnais,
Ill.
, 19 N. W. 2383 (1951); Abrams v. United States, 250
U. S. 616, 617 (1919). Contra: People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 153-4 (G=I. Sess. N. Y.
1938).
55 A public retraction will undo the conclusively presumed damage of the libel pir se in California.
Werner v. So. Calif. Assd. Newspapers, 35 Calif. 2d 121 (1056).
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while use of intemperate language may be in poor taste, it does not deprive the
user of the "prized American privilege to speak one's mind."56 There should be
more substantial proof than the presently accepted historical presumption that
the so-called "fighting words" tend to cause a serious public disturbance, before
free discussion is curtailed or punished when such words are used. The Corn1l
experiments indicate that there is no such tendency, except on those rare occasions
when the "fighting words" are addressed to persons already in a fighting mood
and ready to conflagrate before the criminally libelous words were uttered.
That courts have their doubts on the imminence of violence as a result of the
utterance of "fighting words" is evident whenever they agree with the libeler that
57
a social evil exists which the public should recognize under its true colors. Or
when they believe that the community will suffer from the suppression or discouragement of the speaker.! 8 When he has a message the courts wish the people
to hear, the "imminent violence" becomes trivial or nonexistent. So obvious is this
judicial approach in courtroom conflicts between breach of the peace and freedom
of speech, that law students premise their reviews of the pertinent cases on the presumption that the First Amendment excludes "utterances which have no redeem59
ing social importance" and those which infringe "more important interests."
Fortunately for "freedom," there has been no such stratification of causes or interests-which is the hallmark of the totalitarian state-but recognition that the
"imminence" of violence is usually determined by the subjective emotional reactions
of legislator and judge. 60
Peaceful secondary picketing-the workingman's utterance 1 of the accusation
that the open-shop employer is unfair to labor-was outlawed by the legislatures of
the industrial states because shopkeepers, pedestrians and customers were annoyed,
angered and resentful of the picketers and the signs they carried on the streets.
But for police interference, violence and riot would have occurred. 62 The Supreme
Court held such statutes unconstitutional 6 because "the danger of breach of
the peace or serious invasion of rights of property or privacy at the scene of a
such picketing presented
labor dispute is not sufficiently imminent," or because
"no clear and present danger of substantive evils.'' 64 A group of Jehovah's Witness56 Bridges v. California, note 37, pp. 263, 270; Williamson v. United States, 184 F.zd 280, 285
(C. A. 2d 1950, Jackson, C. J.).
57 Kline v. McBride and Co., Inc., 170 Misc. 170 974, 980 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1939).
58 Near v. Minnesota, 283, U. S. 697, 722, 728 (1931).
59 51 CoL. L. REv. 98 (1951).
60 The "likelihood" of violence is "a question of proximity and degree that cannot be completely
captured in a formula." Bridges v. California, note 37, p. 261.
61 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 2897, 293 (1941). Today
picketing is deemed a "hybrid"-action, of which communication is but one phase. Teamsters Union
v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 474 (1950) ; Hughes v. Superior Court, note 7, p. 464.5; Building Service
Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 537 (1950).
62 People v. Nixon, 248 N. Y. 182, 188 (1928); People v. Kaufman, 165 Misc. 670 (Mag. Ct.
N. Y. 1937); People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67 (1939).
68 A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 325 (1941) People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 284
6
(1941) ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmao Dairies, -Inc., note 1,.p. 296.
S. 106, 113. '(t940).
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es played a victrola record on the street attacking all organized religious systems,
particularly the Catholic Church. A state statute requiring a license for such activities was held unconsitutional because "although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, it raised no such clear and present menace to public
peace and order" as to render the communicant liable to conviction for breach
of the peace.65 Newspaper editors were held in contempt of court because of intemperate and defamatory editorials deemed by state courts to anger and confuse
the trial judges, thus tending to interfere with the fair administration of justice.
The Supreme Court found that the danger of such interference "has not the clearness
and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissible public comment;" 6 it
failed "to sce how the editorial could in any realistic sense create an imminent
and serious threat." 6 7 Refusal to salute the American flag and the public display of
the Soviet flag-both being speech by symbol-were declared by state legislatures
to be- criminal acts inciting or tending to incite violence. The Supreme Court
could find neither a tendency to incite nor incitement in the condemned behavior.6 8
The socialistic utterances that were outlawed because so obviously fraught with
power to generate violence and so obviously menacing to the public peace, seemed
to the Supreme Court's great dissenters mere trivialities which "it is not conceivable
that any man of ordinary intelligence and normal judgment" would take seriously, 69
"poor and puny anonymities" which hav to be "squeezed to turn the color of legal
litmus paper. '70 The anarchistic editorial held clearly dangerous to the public
peace and safety because McKinley was assassinated on the day of its publication,
proved to be a reprint of one published some fifty years previously in an adjoining state. 71 The communistic exhortations of the negroes in the "black belt,"
held by the state courts to be incitement to insurrection, seemed to the Supreme
Court "innocent" documents, "consistent with peaceful action for a change in
the laws." 72
The scientific facts disclosed by the Cornell experiments require that breach
of the peace, whether predicated on libelous, "fighting words" or "imminence of
violence," be unshackled from the emotional reactions of the final governmental
or judicial authority. Feiner's conviction was supported by the trial court's finding
that the police officers "were fully justified in feeling that a situation was developing which could very, very easily result in a serious disorder."1 8 The Supreme
Court similarly has relied onits feelings to decide the recurring conflicts between
65 Cantwell v. Conn,, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940)._
66 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 351, 350 (1946); Bridges v. California, note 37.
67 Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 378 (1947).
68 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943); Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.

S. 624
(1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
69 Pierce v. United States, note 5, p. 272.
70 Abrams v. United States, note 54, p. 629.
71 People v. Most, note 4 (1st case), p. 425.
72 Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 846, 860-5 (1934), appeal dismissed for lack of jur. 295 U. S.
441 (1935); Hetadon v.Lowry, 301 U. S. 252, 260 (1937).
78 Niemotko v. Maland, note 12.

PSYCHOSOMATICS

breach of the peace and freedom of speech. The Cornell experiments show that it
is not the feelings of the police or the trial court or the appellate court or even
the speaker that determine whether the public peace is actually being endangered..
That question is determined by the intensity of feelings of the addressees or audience. The more vital the subject of discussion has been and still is to these listeners,
the more intense their feelings will be. Breach of the peace, in the light of the
experiments, is the exposure of an audience to discussions of matters in which
they already have a direct or associated vital interest. What the police, trial court
and appellate court "feel," is the intensity of that interest and whether it is
sympathetic or antagonistic. The speaker who elicits audible expressions of his
audience's intensity of feeling does not differ much from the clinician to whose
discussions the Cornell patients reacted. The medical experimenters have demonstrated how vital their discussions are to the physical and mental welfare of their
patients. 74 Our history has demonstrated how important public discussion of sociological and political controversies is to the economic and societal welfare of our
citizens. The methods used by the physician to relieve his patients' fears, resentments and hatreds are much the same as those used by the soap box orator. Jailing the orator has no greater curative effect on his audience's emotional reactions
to societal conflicts than incarcerating the physician would have on the psychosomatic ills of his patients.
The punishment of the utterer of breach of the peace speeches and words does
not solve the problem faced by a peace-loving community, i.e. what to do with the
persons so affected by insuperable family, employment or societal problems that
public allusion thereto moves their viscera and their tongues to reactions verging
75
on violence. Our ancestors made presidents, governors and legislators of them.
The Cornell experiments show they can be cured of their sensitivity to fighting
words and controversial causes only by eliminating the social or economic situations they resent or fear, or by changing their attitudes toward them. Which brings
us back to the soundness of the "fundamental right of free men to strive for better
conditions through new legislation and new institutions" and to secure them "by
argument to fellow citizens," 76 'even if the stabler members of the community
are thereby exposed to the spirited vocalizations bordering on violence"l (which
they, in turn, resent or fear). The therapeutic value of this procedure has now
been demonstrated medically, as well as politically. When the resentments of an
agitated audience cannot be eliminated by argument, and there is in fact a "clear
and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
74 Op, cit. notes 16, 26. Illnesses of psychosomatic origin are cured by substituting new personal
and social values, new life goals and different attitudes toward the problems found responsible
for the diseased condition of the viscera.
76 Meigs, THE VIOLENT MEN (.1950).
76 Pierce v. United States, note 5, p. 273.
77 Whitney v. Colifornia, note 6, p. 378--'The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence
or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability
of serious injury to the State."
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streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,"7' the community best serves itself by punishing the threatening auditors-not for their
innate resentments but for failing to modulate and control their oral expressions
of them.7 9 Thereby it retains for all its members "freedom to seek, receive and
80
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,"
even when a considerable number of them are reacting to the tensions of the day
with fear and resentment of all who threaten what remains of yesterday's status quo.
78 Cantwell v. Conn., note 65, p. 308,
'79 Black, J. dissenting in Feiner v. New York, note 1, p. 327, thought the police were under
a duty to "protect Feiner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened
to interfere;" Frankfurter, J., concurring with the Court (Niemotko v. Mayland, note 12. p. 289),
countered: "it is not a constitutional principle that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed
against the crowd, whatever its size and temper, and not against the speaker."
60 UNtrni

NATIONS DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, art. 19 (1949).

